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To my wife and friends. 
“ὥσπερ ἄλλος τις ἢ ἵππῳ ἀγαθῷ ἢ κυνὶ ἢ ὄρνιθι ἥδεται, οὕτω καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἥδομαι φίλοις 
ἀγαθοῖς, καὶ ἐάν τι ἔχω ἀγαθόν, διδάσκω, καὶ ἄλλοις συνίστημι παρ᾽ ὧν ἂν ἡγῶμαι 
ὠφελήσεσθαί τι αὐτοὺς εἰς ἀρετήν. καὶ τοὺς θησαυροὺς τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς 
ἐκεῖνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες, ἀνελίττων κοινῇ σὺν τοῖς φίλοις διέρχομαι, καὶ 
ἄν τι ὁρῶμεν ἀγαθὸν ἐκλεγόμεθα, καὶ μέγα νομίζομεν κέρδος, ἐὰν ἀλλήλοις φίλοι 
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Aristotle’s Politics I.8-11 contains a profound reflection on the relationship between 
moneymaking and the divergent needs of individuals and politics. It offers not only a clear 
confrontation with the issue of scarcity, but, unlike modern economics, also a causal 
explanation of limitless demand. Moreover, Aristotle suggests that the psychological 
consequences of scarcity pull human beings away from the satisfaction of a fuller range of 
their needs, and that clarity about those needs greatly weakens the human passion for 
limitless moneymaking. Need and utility, not unlimited acquisitiveness, are the focus of 
Aristotelian economics. Yet he also shows that clarity about human needs is quite rare, 
and, in political life, necessarily absent. I argue that Aristotle’s teaching in Politics I.8-11 
is that the philosopher, an essentially private individual, is the true economist on account 
of his unique clarity about human neediness. 
 vi 
Table of Contents 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................1 
II. THE QUESTION OF MONEYMAKING ...............................................................................6 
III. SUSTENANCE ...............................................................................................................11 
IV. POLITICAL NEXUS OF THE TELEOLOGICAL DOCTRINE ............................................18 
V. UNNATURAL MONEYMAKING .......................................................................................22 
VI. REASSERTION OF THE TELEOLOGICAL DOCTRINE ....................................................28 
VII. APPLICATION .............................................................................................................32 
VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................37 





Aristotle’s Politics I.8-111 contains a profound reflection on the relationship between money 
and the divergent needs of individuals and politics. It offers not only a clear confrontation with the 
issue of scarcity, but unlike modern economics, also a causal explanation of limitless demand. 
Aristotle’s arguments are not abstract, head-in-the-clouds speculation, as hard-nosed pragmatists 
might expect of philosophers, but eminently useful sources of wisdom about perennial economic 
questions.2 Moreover, while mainstream economists more or less admit the incapacity of their 
discipline to address questions of moral importance, Aristotle’s thought offers masterful direction 
to the individual or statesman in need of knowledge about what he ought to do.3  
Aristotle’s account of moneymaking and economics in Politics I.8-11 is indispensable reading 
for anyone serious about understanding his own or his community’s economic situation, but 
modern economists hardly treat it with due seriousness. This is not due to obsolescence, for 
according to Todd Lowry, “The few economists who have been familiar with the classics, such as 
Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Nassau Senior, Henry Sidgwick, John K. Ingram, and Philip Wicksteed, 
have appreciated the significance and relevance of an ancient Greek thought in economics.”4 
Rather, Aristotle is regarded as a mere stepping stone on the path to true economic science—
 
1 References to the texts of Aristotle are by book and chapter number and/or Bekker number. Roman and Arabic 
numerals refer to book and chapter, respectively. All translations of the Politics are my own, based on the texts W.D. 
Ross, Aristotelis Politica (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957) and W.L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1887), Vol. I-IV. 
2 S. Todd Lowry, The Archaeology of Economic Ideas (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), 240. “In the long 
history of Aristotle’s writings in the West, his economic analysis was for most of that time studied as relevant to 
current economic problems.” 
3 Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 54. 
4 Lowry, The Archaeology of Economic Ideas, 7. For an account of Aristotle’s influence in past and present 
modes of economic thought, see Scott Meikle, Aristotle’s Economic Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
1. For the Aristotelian roots of modern economic concepts, see Lowry, The Archaeology of Economic Ideas, 239-40 




interesting for historical reasons, but not as a genuine challenge. Joseph Schumpeter’s weak 
defense of the study of economic history, for example, says little more than that “we stand to profit 
from visits to the lumber room [a room for storing old furniture] provided we do not stay there too 
long.”5 Then, before he lays out an inaccurate and superficial summary of Aristotle’s economics, 
he dismisses it as “embryonic.”6 Nonetheless, Schumpeter at least deserves credit for reading 
Aristotle. On the whole, “young economists are being trained as technicians with little 
understanding of the history or broader methodological and philosophical aspects of their field, 
and the history of economic thought has come to be regarded in some quarters as a highly 
dispensable academic pursuit.”7 Modern economists do not generally ignore Aristotle because they 
have read and disagree with his arguments, but because of intellectual laziness.8 
If economists remain uninterested in the philosophic dimensions of their discipline, they will 
never come to understand the full complexity of Aristotelian economics and therefore never face 
one of the most thoughtfully articulated challenges to the content, orientation, and even self-
understanding of modern economics. According to Lowry, “[Modern] definitions of economics 
vary from the conception of it as the study of self-regulating, price-forming market processes, to 
the study of unlimited human wants impinging upon scarce physical resources…, to the value-
free, abstract study of the maximization of efficiency in any given set of relationships.”9 For 
Aristotle, the proper study of economics is not the limitless, but the proper limit, whereas focus on 
 
5 Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, 3. 
6 Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, 57. 
7 Lowry, The Archaeology of Economic Ideas, 8. 
8 Lowry, The Archaeology of Economic Ideas, 8. Lowry quotes economist Daniel Bell, who said: “When the 
world is messy…you fall back either on ideology or technique. Good young people respond to the seductions of 
technique. It’s independent of experience, and you don’t have to know much.”  





limitlessness reflects a failure to understand economics. An economic science that only describes 
market processes, efficiency, and the satisfaction of limitless desires is very incomplete, Aristotle 
would say, because it lacks an account of need and utility necessary for providing structure to the 
other dimensions of economics. Yet economists are more likely to dismiss Aristotle as someone 
uninterested in real economics than to consider the possibility that economics suffers from a 
fundamental deficiency.10 Meanwhile, modern economics continues to elide “the distinction 
between use value and exchange value,” thereby losing clarity about “perhaps the most important 
question that can be asked in respect of economic matters.”11 Aristotle understands the 
fundamental questions of economics even better than modern economists, but his wisdom is in 
danger of being forgotten because we assume he must be wrong.  
Another obstacle to appreciating the full richness of Aristotle’s economics is superficial 
reading. One simply cannot understand Aristotle without serious attention to his rhetorical 
strategy. According to al-Farabi, the great medieval Aristotelian, “the modes of abstruseness, 
obscurity, and complexity in Aristotle’s procedure, despite his apparent intention to explain and 
elucidate, will not be concealed from anyone who carefully investigates his scientific teachings, 
studies his books, and perseveres with them.”12 Aristotle presents a superficial intention to be a 
clear expositor, but those who read with care will notice deliberately placed puzzles meant to 
complicate the surface-level teaching. Reading Aristotle requires carefulness, perseverance, and 
inquisitiveness. Indeed, this older, truer understanding of the demands of reading philosophic texts 
generally and Aristotle in particular has been well documented, but modern scholars are still 
 
10 Lowry, The Archaeology of Economic Ideas, 7. 
11 Meikle, Aristotle’s Economic Thought, 191-93. 
12 Al-Farabi, “The Harmonization of the Two Opinions of the Two Sages: Plato the Divine and Aristotle,” 
in Alfarabi, The Political Writings: ‘Selected Aphorisms’ and Other Texts, trans. Charles E. Butterworth (Ithaca: 




largely unattuned to Aristotle’s rhetorical strategy.13 The result, of course, is a failure to understand 
the philosophy of Aristotle. This tendency towards superficiality is so pervasive that only a handful 
modern scholarly works covering Aristotle’s Politics I.8-11 demonstrate an appreciation of 
Aristotle’s rhetorical complexity.14 
Careful attention to Aristotle’s rhetorical strategy in Politics I.8-11 reveals that Aristotle may 
understand the requirements of a true science of economics even better than we moderns. We shall 
find, in the first place, that Aristotle is neither bound by an “influence of prejudices which he 
shared with his age and nation,” nor is he “inclined to cut all societies after the same pattern.”15 
We shall also find that Aristotle does not find true economic knowledge in the capacity to create 
self-regulating systems for the satisfaction of our infinitely expanding desires; rather, he finds it in 
clarity about genuine need and utility, lack of which is the root of infinite desire. Yet he recognizes 
also that political life is dependent on this very lack of clarity, and would endorse only very careful, 
marginal political change in the direction of genuine economic clarity. Most importantly, Aristotle 
saw that economic science is ultimately not an instrument for political progress at all, but rather 
the philosophic clarity of a few privately oriented individuals.  
 
13 Arthur M Melzer, “Aristotle, The ‘Cuttlefish’,” in Philosophy Between the Lines (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 2014), 30-46. See also Arthur M. Melzer, “A Chronological Compilation of Testimonial Evidence for 
Esotericism,” University of Chicago Press, accessed May 1, 2020, https://press.uchicago.edu/sites/melzer/index.html. 
For Aristotle’s rhetorical strategy in his political works, see Thomas L. Pangle, “The Rhetorical Strategy Governing 
Aristotle’s Political Teaching,” Journal of Politics 73, no. 1 (Jan. 2011). 
14 Chronologically, these are: Mary Pollingue Nichols, “The Good Life, Slavery, and Acquisition: Aristotle’s 
Introduction to Politics,” Interpretation 11, no. 2 (May 1983); Wayne H. Ambler, “Aristotle on 
Acquisition,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 17, no. 3 (Sept. 1984); Wayne H. Ambler, “Aristotle’s 
Understanding of the Naturalness of the City,” Review of Politics 47, no. 2 (Apr. 1985); Mary P. Nichols, Citizens 
and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle’s Politics (Savage: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992); Pangle, “The Rhetorical Strategy 
Governing Aristotle’s Political Teaching;” and Thomas L. Pangle, Aristotle’s Teaching in the Politics (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 2013). 





What follows is an exegesis of Aristotle’s Politics I.8-11 with special focus on how Aristotle’s 
economic science emerges from and relates to his rhetorical project. I will attempt to show the full 
range of questions that Aristotle believed must be answered in order to qualify as a true economist, 
and also why he believed lack of clarity about them is necessary for political life. My primary 
intent, however, is to show the gulf between the genuine economic clarity offered by philosophy 




II. THE QUESTION OF MONEYMAKING16 
The primary puzzle of Book I of Aristotle’s Politics is the relationship between expertise in 
political rule,17 kingly rule, economics,18 and mastery of slaves. Its treatment begins in I.1 with a 
statement of the Socratic argument that the expert in one of these has expertise in them all.19 On 
the basis of the argument’s ignobility, Aristotle rejects it.20 By the supposition of the Socratics, 
Aristotle says, “a big household and a small city do not differ; and…on the one hand, whenever 
one has authority himself, he is a king, while, on the other hand, whenever one rules and is ruled 
in turn according to the reasonings of this sort of science [the kingly], he is a statesman” (1252a12-
16). According to the view Aristotle challenges, the ability to take care of oneself and one’s 
household is a science, which, when expanded in scope, becomes the other arts of rule. By 
extension, the core of statesmanship is then the no more dignified than the tasks of economics. 
Aristotle, on the contrary, at least presents himself as agreeing with the conventional opinion that 
 
16 Aristotle’s term is the Greek word χρηματιστική, the many meanings of which center around active acquisition. 
Generally, “moneymaking,” understood as having a slightly negative connotation, is the best translation of the term 
in the context of Politics 8-11, though often “acquisition” is more appropriate. I use both “moneymaking” and 
“acquisition” according to context, but with preference for the former. For helpful discussions of the word’s meaning, 
see Carnes Lord, Aristotle’s Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 18n33 and Newman, The Politics 
of Aristotle, Vol. II, 165. 
17 The Greek term πολιτική is translated as “expert political rule” or “statesmanship.” The term πολιτικός, is 
translated similarly as “expert politician” or “statesman.” 
18 The primary meaning of οἰκονομική is “household management,” but I have preferred “economics” in order 
to facilitate thought about the distance between modern economics and the economics of Aristotle. οἰκονομικός, a 
related term that occurs in I.1, is translated as “skilled economist.” On the derivation of the name of the modern 
discipline from the term’s usage by the Socratic philosopher Xenophon, see Lowry, The Archaeology of Economic 
Ideas, 247. Economics as “household management,” that is, as having an essential administrative component, was the 
primary usage of the term for most of its history. On how the shift to the modern usage is rooted in a break between 
ancient and modern economic thought, see Lowry, The Archaeology of Economic Ideas, 240. 
19 Xenophon, Memorabilia, III.4.12: “Do not look down, [Socrates] said, upon men who are expert economists. 
For caring to private affairs differs from caring to public ones only in magnitude.” Translation mine. 




statesmanship is more dignified. Rather than giving an argument in conventional opinion’s 
defense, however, he claims that the rest of Book I will make this clear.21  
The Socratic argument about the relationship between the arts of ruling entails that if a man 
cannot rule himself or his household, he also does not possess a true understanding of politics. 
Therefore, the question of the relationship, soon to be broached, between moneymaking and 
economics is by no means minor. If one must have expertise in both economics and politics in 
order to have it in either of them, then failure to possess expertise in moneymaking might discredit 
the claim of ordinary political men to have skill in not just economics, but also politics. The 
legitimacy and dignity of ordinary political men is at stake in Aristotle’s apparently trivial inquiry 
into moneymaking.  
Aristotle begins the inquiry by setting out some possibilities. He says, “ First, one might raise 
the question whether moneymaking is (1) the same as economics, or (2) some part, or (3) 
subordinate to it, and if subordinate, whether it is subordinate as (3a) shuttle making is to weaving 
or as (3b) bronzeworking is to sculpting” (1256a3-7). Aristotle’s first possibility entails that being 
good at making money is both necessary and sufficient for running a home well, while the second 
and third possibilities entail that making money is necessary for running a home well but not 
sufficient. The sub-possibilities of (3) differ by the way in which making money is necessary for 
running a home well. The difference between the two is whether the art provides the instruments 
or the matter of the relevant art. If the art of getting goods provides instruments, then moneymaking 
only provides the stuff necessary for the core activity of economics. If moneymaking provides the 
 
21 Ambler, “Aristotle’s Understanding of the Naturalness of the City,” 166. “Aristotle thus suggests that the 
second chapter’s account of the city’s growth is the most noble way of seeing the city, whereas he said above that an 
analysis of its parts would make the issue clear…It is left to the reader to determine the extent to which the longer 




matter, then the core activity of economics is completed through making money and consequently 
any other necessary component of economics would be auxiliary. 
Aristotle quickly dismisses his first possibility by assuming the matter in dispute. “It is clear,” 
he claims, “that economics is not the same as moneymaking, for it belongs to the one 
[moneymaking] to furnish and to the other [economics] to use. For what is the skill that uses 
household things if not economics?” (1256a11-13).22 The initial question was whether 
moneymaking is (1) the same as, (2) an essential aspect of, (3a) an instrument of, or (3b) the 
essential core of economics. Now, however, he urges us to assume, first, that the same art cannot 
both supply and use, and second, that the essential core of economics cannot be to supply—ruling 
out options (1), (2), and (3b). But one other obvious possibility, at least for a good Athenian citizen, 
is that moneymaking is the chief component of economics, and that it derives its dignity from 
providing for other arts. Thomas Pangle helpfully argues that a civically-minded gentleman would 
likely understand the point of economics to be profit-generation that provides leisure and other 
equipment for employment in civic life.23 Why not say that moneymaking is economics, which is 
in turn an instrument of the more dignified art of statesmanship? 
Aristotle’s peculiar first step to the question of the relationship between moneymaking and 
economics ignores the civically-minded understanding of households as incomplete, subsidiary 
associations of the political community. Turning us away from the more civic possibility, he forces 
us to consider instead what the core of economics would be if it were not moneymaking. What is 
 
22 With this casual statement, Aristotle implicitly rejects all modern definitions of economics, at least by Lowry’s 
account. See Lowry, The Archaeology of Economic Ideas, 8. 
23 Pangle, Aristotle’s Teaching in the Politics, 53. The possibility raised by Pangle is the most obvious possible 
relationship between moneymaking, economics, and statesmanship in light of the relationship between individuals, 
the household, and the political community presented in I.2. If I.2 gives an embellished basis for traditional opinion, 




this art of using property that Aristotle suggests is the core of economics? What would it mean to 
use property well? The civic perspective would understand good use to be equipping an individual 
for civic life and thereby providing the opportunity to advance the common good of the 
community. By ushering away this understanding of the relationship between economics and 
statesmanship, Aristotle has primed our thinking in the direction of outside of the political 
perspective. 
This first step redirects our attention to the question “whether moneymaking is a part of 
economics or different in kind” (1256a13-14). Rather than considering the more expansive 
question of the relationship between moneymaking and economics, we now proceed on the 
assumption that if moneymaking has a share in economics at all (which is now an open question), 
it must be only an instrumental part.24 With this in mind, he says, “if it belongs to the skilled 
moneymaker to see from where money and property come, and if property and wealth include 
many parts, one must then consider first if farming is some part of moneymaking or of some other 
type, and if this is the case regarding concern for sustenance generally and its possessions” 
(1256a15-19) Aristotle’s explicit justification for the shift to farming is understandable enough: 
farming and the various means of acquiring sustenance indeed seem to be modes of moneymaking, 
so an account of the art would need to include them. Nevertheless, we must wonder how this will 
reveal anything about whether moneymaking is a part of economics or different in kind.  
The puzzling shift to farming only becomes more baffling upon consideration of Aristotle’s 
audience. An important part of Athenian politics and economics were gentlemen who farmed for 
 
24 Newman, The Politics of Aristotle, Vol. I, 127. “Aristotle, on the other hand, feels bound to ask whether the 
Science of Supply is a part of Household Science at all. He had, indeed, incidentally taken this for granted in an early 
chapter of the Politics (I.3.1253b12), but later on (I.8.1256a3 sq.), he seems inclined to recede from this hasty 




profit in order to afford the means and leisure for rigorous political participation.25 To ask if 
farming is a mode of skilled moneymaking is then to question whether these gentlemen—a large 
portion of Aristotle’s audience26—truly understand moneymaking, how to manage their homes, 
and the relationship between their private and public affairs. In effect, Aristotle forces his audience 
to consider the possibility that its own conception of good politics, being premised on an 
economics which has farming for profit as its core, might be fundamentally flawed.27 
Aristotle does not explicitly dwell on the implications of his suggestion about farming and 
moneymaking, but the general character of his transition to discussing the other modes of 
sustenance further radicalizes them. First, he shifts the primary aspect of his concern for farming 
from its profit-making potential to its sustenance-supplying potential, and then to the modes of 
sustenance supplying generally. He has thereby raised the provision of only most necessary needs 
as a rival standard to the one implicit in the civic perspective. Taken with Aristotle’s earlier hinting 
that the standard for good use might not be political, we must now at least begin to wonder about 
the skilled moneymaker’s attitude toward civic life viz-à-viz his basic needs as an individual. 
 
25 Lowry, The Archaeology of Economic Ideas, 48. 
26 Pangle, Aristotle’s Teaching in the Politics, 5 and 18. 
27 Pangle, Aristotle’s Teaching in the Politics, 53. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, 57, is then clearly 
incorrect. He claims, “Nothing would be easier to show that [Aristotle] was primarily concerned with the ‘natural’ 
and the ‘just’ as seen from the standpoint of his ideal of the good and virtuous life, and that the economic facts and 
relations between economic facts which he considered and evaluated appear in light of the ideological preconceptions 
to be expected in a man who lived in, and wrote for, a cultivated leisure class, which held work and business pursuits 





III. SUSTENANCE  
Aristotle begins his account of the other modes of sustenance with a cryptic claim: “Indeed, 
there are many forms of sustenance, and hence many ways of life both for animals and for human 
beings” (1256a19-21).28 There is a causal relationship between an animal’s diet and its way of life, 
Aristotle suggests, including for human beings. Ignoring for a moment the claim about animal life, 
this at least is not obviously true for human beings. Aristotle next offers a partial explanation, 
saying, “For it is not possible to live without sustenance, with the result that the differences of 
sustenance make the ways of life of animals differ.” This makes sense only if preservation itself is 
the sole concern of animals. While the other animals may have such a narrow range of concerns, 
human beings appear to care about far more. Aristotle even hints at his awareness of this difficulty 
in the passage; for while Aristotle argues that sustenance determines the ways of life of animals, 
but he never argues that sustenance completely determines the ways of life of human beings. 
Human beings appear to be unique among animals in that sustenance alone does not determine 
their ways of life. 
Aristotle defends the general thrust of this argument by unfolding a teleological doctrine.29 He 
begins,  
For some of the beasts are herd animals while others are scattered, whichever of the two is 
advantageous for their sustenance on account of the fact that some are carnivorous while 
others are herbivores and omnivores, with the result that nature has marked out their ways 
of life with a view to their ease and inclinations….likewise also for human beings. For their 
ways of life differ much (1256a23-30). 
 
28 Emphasis in quotes from Aristotle is always my own. 
29 Ambler, “Aristotle on Acquisition,” 493, speaking in the first person, argues that this doctrine has a quasi-
religious character, “I noted first the striking suggestion that nature, like a beneficent deity, makes all things for man’s 






This step suggests that nature has made life easy for all animals, but also raises an important 
difficulty for the position.30 Is not the sustenance of the carnivore some other animal? Nature has 
equipped some animals to kill others, for whom it has in turn provided too inadequately for 
successful defense. Aristotle’s teleological account is not actually one of peace and harmony, but 
hierarchy and predation. Aristotle seems to have intended both to give a misimpression that the 
artless life of an animal is smooth sailing and to hint subtly at the contrary. 
Aristotle’s account of nature, as we have seen, suggests that nature is beneficent. This 
impression only grows as the account proceeds until nature is even said to provide for grown 
animals as mothers provide for their young. But while the tone of the passage suggests this, the 
argument of the text never necessarily requires it. As we shall see, Aristotle offers frequent hints 
that a less exalted reading may make more sense. It will be important for understanding I.8 both 
to follow the exalted overtones as they unfold and to attempt to find the more sensible suggestions 
underlying them. In effect, we must follow two different readings at the same time: an exalted 
reading and a skeptical one.  
Next, Aristotle elaborates the human applications of his teleological doctrine. He claims that 
there are five human ways of life, at least as pertains to “naturally arising work”: the skilled nomad, 
the skilled pirate, the skilled fisher, the skilled hunter, and the skilled farmer” (1256a40-b2).31 But 
this portrait of human life fails to parallel animal life in a number of important respects. First, the 
difference between the tiger and the gazelle’s way of life came about as a result of their differing 
diets by nature. While a farmer may eat more vegetables than a fisherman, they are not by nature 
herbivores and carnivores respectively. Second, none of these ways of life are natural for man in 
 
30 Ambler, “Aristotle on Acquisition,” 491. 




the same way that acquisition of sustenance is for animals. Even the idlest of nomads, whose 
sustenance comes “without labor and amid leisure” still must use human art to satisfy his needs.32 
In fact, Aristotle underscores this when he argues that “Those who mix these ways of life live 
pleasantly, supplementing their deficient way of life,  in whatever way it happens to be lacking in 
self-sufficiency…they live in whatever manner need together with pleasure compels” (1256b2-7).  
The wily Aristotle, however, does not concede these points, but rather doubles down on his 
teleological doctrine. He says, “Now such property appears to be given by nature herself to all 
animals. Just as it is given straightaway from their birth, so too when they have matured” (1256b7-
10). Evidence for this, he says, is the milk some animals give to their offspring. But what is the 
breastmilk for a grown man if not the plants and animals for whom nature allegedly provides? If 
man’s sustenance really were as available as breastmilk, he would not need human art. In fact, we 
seem to use art precisely because our most basic needs are not so easily met. Perhaps Aristotle’s 
teleological doctrine is intended to teach, through its curious absurdities, that our vulnerability and 
our capacity for art are connected.  
Finally, Aristotle resolves some difficulties by explicitly arguing that some beings exist for the 
sake of others. “One must suppose,” he argues, “both that plants came into being for the sake of 
animals and that the other animals are for the sake of human beings” (1256b15-17).33 On the level 
of the exalted reading, this solution comes at the expense of still more difficulties. Chiefly, even if 
we suppose this were true, animals seem to go against nature’s designs quite frequently. How 
would this argument account for the obvious reality that lions, vipers, sharks, and many other 
 
32 Ambler, “Aristotle on Acquisition,” 491. Amber makes this point by focusing on the curious inclusion of 
plunder as one of the natural ways of life. I agree that this is the most obvious example of human artfulness in the 
account, but I think it important to emphasize that not just one, but all five of the ways of life presented require some 
degree of artfulness.  




animals consume human beings? These dissensions within nature’s ranks seem frequent enough 
to call into doubt Aristotle’s argument altogether. Aristotle says we “must suppose it,” but why 
must we suppose every living thing on Earth exists for the sake of man’s well-being, especially 
given all the evidence to the contrary?  
Aristotle argues that we need anthropocentricism in order to preserve the tenability of natural 
purposefulness. He says, “If, then, nature makes nothing that is incomplete or purposeless, nature 
must necessarily have made all of these for the sake of human beings.” According to the more 
exalted reading of I.8, this suggestion makes some sense. If an animal was intended to be eaten by 
another animal, nature cannot have intended it to have accomplished some end through its own 
agency, but rather through that which ate it. Yet the objection remains that animals seem to defy 
the natural order quite often—especially those that consume human beings. If nature is purposeful, 
its purposefulness must be of a different character than the exalted reading of I.8 suggests. 
The most fundamental argument of Aristotle’s teleological doctrine rests on the premise that 
nature is not incomplete or purposeless. If by “nature,” we mean a cosmic force that marshals forth 
the fruits of the Earth for man’s ready consumption, then this premise would be problematic for 
the many reasons shown above. Yet suggestions about natural purposefulness occur throughout 
the Aristotelian corpus. Consideration of these is helpful for uncovering the serious thoughts 
behind the exalted reading of Aristotle’s suggestions about purposefulness.  




One of our principles is that the nature [of a particular sort of being] does nothing pointless, 
but always, given the possibilities, does what is best for the substantial being of each kind 
of animal.34  
The difference between the teleology of Politics I.8 and that of Aristotle’s biological writings 
is the inclusion of natures in the latter versus the apparently singular nature of the former. And 
while we have not seen evidence that some singular nature provides for human beings, we have 
been given suggestions that human nature does. When Aristotle presented nature’s provisions for 
man as different ways of life, we noticed that these ways of life were artful. While human nature 
entails facing hardship, human beings indeed seem capable by nature of addressing them through 
the development and use of arts. Nature’s benevolence for man, unique among animals, is the 
ability to use art rather than the guidance of pleasure, pain, and instinct for the satisfaction of his 
needs.35 
Other passages from the Aristotelian corpus also help to make sense of the claim that plants 
exist for the sake of animals and animals exist for the sake of human beings. In On Soul, Aristotle 
argues that recognition of a knowable or perceptible thing as a sort of thing requires that the 
intellect be “in a certain way the intelligible things in potentiality, but in actuality it is none of 
them until it should think them” (429b30-31).36 He then proceeds, “Now, bringing together the 
things said about the soul, let us say again that the soul is in a certain way all beings; for the beings 
 
34 Thomas L. Pangle, “A Synoptic Introduction to the Ontological Background of Aristotle’s Political 
Theory,” Interpretation 46, no. 2 (Spring 2020): 279n40. The translation here is his. Pangle’s note also has a helpful 
catalogue of 59 passages in the Aristotelian corpus related to the purposefulness of nature in living beings.  
See also Pangle, “A Synoptic Introduction to the Ontological Background of Aristotle’s Political 
Theory,” 272n26. Discussing Allan Gotthelf, “Aristotle's Conception of Final Causality,” Review of Metaphysics 30, 
no. 2 (Dec. 1976): 229, Pangle says, “[beginning with a quote of Gotthelf] ‘In almost every passage in which Aristotle 
introduces, discusses, or argues for the existence of final causality, his attention is focused on the generation and 
development of a living organism’ ([Pangle’s addition] ‘the nature,’ not nature as a whole).”  
35 Ambler, “Aristotle on Acquisition,” 494. 





are either perceptibles or intelligibles, and knowledge is in a certain way the knowables, and 
perception is in a certain way the perceptibles” (431b20-23). Things cannot be perceived or known 
as what they are unless they have the potential to be perceived or known as what they are. This 
potential must lie in the perceiver or knower; the perceiver or knower is that with the capacity to 
perceive know. But this means that reality as it appears (that is, reality simply) is inseparable from 
the activity of the human mind and its concerns. Human need would be inseparable from beings 
as perceived or known in reality, which is itself anthropocentric.37 
Anthropomorphic claims elicit some skepticism from us moderns, but Aristotle’s On Soul 
helps us understand how a certain anthropomorphism may be true. The exalted reading of Politics 
I.8 presents an anthropomorphism in which nature has ordained a sort of cosmic food chain with 
man at the peak. Our modern temptation is to understand this as saying that—even or especially 
as beings independent of the perspective of human beings—animals exist for our needs. We expect 
reality to be independent from our concerns and detached from their potential utility for us. 
Aristotle’s response to us, however, would be that not only is the world of our concern all we have, 
but it is what most matters for us anyway. Granting this, would not reality then be infused with a 
variety of differing natures, each of which contain in part the capacity to address our needs? A 
deep understanding of cows, for example, would include a recognition of their potential to become 
hamburgers. Reality, being inseparable from the categories of thought of the human mind, in a 
 
37 I would not have been able to reach this conclusion without Pangle, “A Synoptic Introduction to the 
Ontological Background of Aristotle’s Political Theory,” 265. He argues, “Aristotle’s zoological writings teach that 
the human soul with mind not only thus contributes fundamentally to the constituting of reality, but that the human 
being, on account of the distinctive activity of intellect and prudence, is the peak among the beings (ousiai) of reality 
thus constituted. So reality is profoundly anthropocentric. The entities of or in reality are pragmata of human needful 
praxis (including theoretical praxis or pragmateuo…), entailing human orientation, evaluation, and 
ranking…Aristotle endorses a sober interpretation of the famous Protagorean pronouncement, “the human is the 
measure of all”… If we may venture to apply somewhat helpful Nietzschean expressions, the ‘real’ world is ‘the world 




way must present the plants and animals as existing for the sake of our needs. This is the serious, 
but far from obvious, core of Aristotle’s anthropocentrism in I.8. 
To recap what we have learned thus far, Aristotle’s teleological doctrine in I.8 has at least two 
possible readings. First, there is an exalted reading in which nature has shown benevolence for all 
animals and especially human beings. By this reading, primitive life is comfortable existence and 
human art is not necessary. A second, skeptical reading presents itself once one recognizes the 
flaws of the exalted reading. The exalted reading points to difficulties, the working out of which 
ultimately results in more sensible suggestions. These sensible suggestions, however, do not 
contradict the text of the passage in themselves. They were always viable interpretive possibilities, 
though we likely would not have thought of them without the urgings of the exalting reading’s 
difficulties.  
The skeptical reading of I.8 yields a lesson about the relationship between nature and art and 
the character of anthropocentrism. We reached this by beginning first with the exalted reading, 
which suggested that basic arts of acquisition were given to us by nature. This suggestion is absurd 
because nobody is born with knowledge of these arts; if they were not taught for a few generations, 
the arts could be completely forgotten. But even being skeptical, we must admit that the capacity 
to develop arts does seem to be natural for human beings. This means that natural things, as they 
appear to human beings, are also potentially useful (or useless)—including plants and animals. 
The skeptical reading of I.8 shows that human nature provides the capacity for art as a remedy for 
man’s neediness, and as a result shapes our perception of things to include their potential for use. 
Plants and animals are for the sake of human beings.38 
 




IV. POLITICAL NEXUS OF THE TELEOLOGICAL DOCTRINE 
Admittedly, Aristotle does not offer an explicit justification for natural purposefulness, but 
rather a corollary of it. He says, “Hence warfare is in a way skilled possession [κτητική] by nature, 
for hunting is part of it, which is necessary to use with a view both to beasts and to however many 
human beings by nature should be ruled but are unwilling, as this sort of war is by nature just” 
(1256b23-26). At first, this appears to be a completely separate point rather than a corollary, but 
closer consideration shows the connection. Aristotle’s teleological doctrine posits that (1) certain 
beings are for the sake of others, (2) human beings are the highest beings in this hierarchy, and (3) 
nature’s benevolence for human beings are the various artful ways of life. Consistent with this 
third element, if men need a certain form of rule, then nature must have provided the art by which 
they enter into it. The beginnings of politics or the household would then be analogous to the 
relationship between a hunter and his prey—the necessary consequences of a naturally ordained 
hierarchy. That is, if the acquisition of rule is natural, then we must add to his teleological thesis 
that even some human beings exist for the sake of others.39 
Surprisingly, only at this step does Aristotle suggest that lower beings in nature’s hierarchy 
might act in defiance of the natural order. For warfare is only part of skilled possession because it 
provides for the subjugation of “however many human beings by nature should be ruled but are 
unwilling.” Why are they unwilling to be ruled? Did they not get the message that nature has 
already determined their fates? Also, in what way are some humans naturally suited to be ruled or 
to rule? One could understand this section of the teleology as saying that the natural rulers and 
subjects are simply those determined to be so by nature. But even by our exalted reading, nature 
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exercises her beneficence for human beings through a natural understanding of various arts. The 
natural ruler would then be the economist or the statesman, while the natural subject would be the 
one without it.  
At first, this section seems to justify all extant human rule, but closer consideration suggests 
the opposite. The naturalness of the art of war turns on the character of its product: a war justified 
by nature is one that results in the rule of economists or statesman over the ignorant. If all extant 
rule was established by truly wise statesmen, then those regimes would be legitimate by the 
standard of natural right (“as this sort of war is by nature just”). But one of the guiding questions 
of Aristotle’s account of acquisition is the relationship of acquisitive expertise to economics and 
statesmanship. That is, we do not yet know whether ordinary political men possess arts of rule 
because we are currently considering the possible contents of those arts. Preliminarily, we may say 
that if sustenance rather than profit really is the standard for acquisition, the profit-maximizing 
approach to economics, necessary for gentlemanly politics, could be mistaken. If this is the case, 
then the exercise of war for the establishment of those politics would not be natural. Many, if not 
all, extant regimes would fall short of the standard of natural right. 
Surprisingly, Aristotle next makes a bold criticism of Solon, Athens’ ancestral lawgiver. The 
questions raised by this textual move offer a hint as to the political purpose of his teleology.  
Therefore, one form of skilled possession is according to nature part of economics, that 
which must either exist or which economics must provide in such a manner to provide that 
it exist, it being a storing of goods necessary with a view to life and of things useful for the 
association of the city or household. At any rate, this seems to be true wealth. For self-
sufficiency by possession of these things with a view to a good life is not limitless, as Solon 
says, having written, “of wealth no limit lies having been revealed to men” (1256b26-34).40 
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Solon, according to Aristotle, asserted that there is no clear limitation to human acquisition, 
while in fact there is a natural standard: the necessary and useful. But Aristotle’s treatment of 
Solon turns out to be disingenuous. Pangle directs us to the context of the quoted passage of Solon: 
“In the context (preserved in Stobaeus 9.25), Solon is teaching that our otherwise insatiable quest 
for wealth ought to be limited to just pursuits by our fear of retributive sanctions visited upon 
mortals by Zeus. Solon makes no reference to nature or the natural moral order.”41 
Though Aristotle has set himself up in opposition to Solon, we observe that he, like Solon, 
intends to restrain human acquisition. Both Solon’s cultivation of pious fear and Aristotle’s 
cosmology provide support for only moderate acquisition. Yet we observe also that Aristotle seems 
to be attempting to replace Solon’s basis for this moderation with his own. While we are not in a 
position to understand his reasoning for this at the moment, we can make a preliminary 
observation. On the one hand, the restraint of Solon’s Athens requires a belief in retributive 
punishment—that justice actually has force in the world. Aristotle, on the other, offers a natural 
standard even though acquisition beyond this standard is ubiquitous, as he himself will show in 
I.9.  
Aristotle leaves us thinking that the only natural acquisition is that done in accordance with 
need and utility, which in turn are to be narrowly construed as sustenance or things conducive to 
it.42 Yet one must wonder what is wrong with Solon’s approach, viz. allowing for acquisition 
beyond utility while moderating potential excesses through a cultivated reverence for divine law? 
 
41 Pangle, Aristotle’s Teaching in the Politics, 282n59. See also Lowry, The Archaeology of Economic Ideas, 
233 and 322n66. 
42 Aristotle offers a hint that this may not be his final word on the matter, however, by saying that natural 
acquisition provides things “useful for the association of the city or household.” “Useful for association of the city” 




Does Aristotle really expect to bring all political action into accordance with this very narrow, 




V. UNNATURAL MONEYMAKING 
Aristotle begins I.9 by explaining the difference between natural and unnatural moneymaking. 
He says, “but there is another type of moneymaking…on account of which it is believed that no 
limit exists for wealth and property” (1256b40-57a1). This moneymaking and its counterpart, 
Aristotle suggests, are both arts. Nonetheless, while they appear to be the same on account of 
“resemblance” and are indeed not far different from one another, the limitlessness of unnatural 
moneymaking necessitates a distinction between the two. But curiously, Aristotle decides on the 
basis of this distinction not that these are two separate arts, as he said just a couple dozen words 
prior, but rather that natural moneymaking is not an art at all. On account of their difference with 
respect to limitlessness, he says, “the one is by nature, while the other is not by nature, but comes 
into being more and more through some experience and art” (1257a3-5).  
Both the last sentence of I.8 and the very beginning of I.9 assert that natural moneymaking is 
an art, but the latter is soon contradicted with a reversion to collapsing the distinction between 
nature and certain forms of human art. Now Aristotle suggests that certain forms of art are not 
actually art at all while those that remain arose out of malicious human inventiveness. Throughout 
most of I.9, Aristotle will use this distinction as the basis for a history of mankind’s descent into 
economic degeneracy. Beginning with natural acquisition, he unfolds for us an account of man’s 
deepening economic perversity that reaches its trough at commercial activity.  
Aristotle begins his account with a simple axiom: “each possession has a double use.” The first 
use is “proper to the thing,” i.e. using the possession for the purpose according to which it was 
designed. The second, “not proper to the thing,” is trading the possession for something else. Barter 
arises from the latter usage. Aristotle says, “it was brought into being at first from something 




Aristotle’s second stage in man’s economic history is the development of money to facilitate 
trade of possessions difficult to transport. Convention at this point supplements nature’s limitations 
via compact. Aristotle’s account here is revealing about his use of nature as a standard. The use of 
money in itself is not problematic, he suggests, because it came into being from “necessary 
exchange.”  Money comes into being on account of a natural need but does not for this reason 
become natural. If it did, the distinction between nature and convention would be meaningless. 
Nor would it be sensible to say that, on the basis of their conventionality, all conventions should 
be avoided. Conventions can be good when they remedy a natural need. Thus Aristotle encourages 
us to wonder in what way nature serves as his standard for politics. While Aristotle earlier 
suggested that the standard for political action was sustenance and utility narrowly construed, he 
now appears to be expanding this to allow for the satisfaction of natural needs and the conventions 
that assist in this satisfaction.  
Commerce arises shortly after the creation of money. At first, money was used for necessary 
exchange, but it also makes possible an art of “trading from whatever and in whatever way it will 
make the greatest profit” (1257b4-5). This step makes intuitive sense, for all extant political 
communities seem to have people trying to maximize their share of money. But it also adds to our 
understanding of Aristotle’s use of nature as a standard. Convention may be good, as we learn 
from Aristotle’s treatment of the invention of money, but it becomes bad when it has deleterious 
effects. Natural need both legitimizes and delegitimizes conventions on the basis of their 
contribution to the economy of human needs.  
Having laid out the historical origins of unnatural acquisition, Aristotle transitions to an 
extended treatment of the problems posed by it. First, he argues that people only believe money to 




money, yet when economic collapses occur, money seems “to be something nonsensical and to 
exist altogether by convention.” Money tricks us into thinking we have stores of genuinely 
valuable possessions when we really do not. Through money, it becomes possible for people to 
believe that they have all they need even if they are actually “in want of necessary sustenance.”  
Aristotle’s next step is convoluted. Explicitly, he argues that the cause of profit-seeking relates 
to the character of art itself. He says, “And this wealth, that from [commercial] moneymaking, is 
indeed without limit. For just as there is no limit for the doctor with respect to being healthy,  each 
of the arts is also limitless with respect to its end…thus there is no limit for this sort of 
moneymaking, and the end is wealth of this sort and possession of money” (1257b23-30). 
Aristotle’s argument about the arts sounds reasonable enough until one substitutes for medicine 
any of the other arts. Wealth and health are goods that people tend to pursue without limit, but they 
are unique in this regard. Carpenters and tailors, for example, do not pursue the ends of their art 
limitlessly because people do not pursue housing or suiting endlessly.43 In the case of most arts, 
clients’ needs limit demand, which limits the usage of the art. The art of moneymaking and 
medicine are apparently different in that they are not limited by their beneficiaries’ awareness of 
the degree to which they need the product. Just as people irrationally seek medicine beyond what 
medicine can accomplish, so too do they seek wealth beyond what it can accomplish. 
The cause of this, Aristotle argues, is fear of death coupled with thoughtlessness about living—
a condition which apparently affects all of us as citizens in a capitalist regime.44 He says, “The 
cause of this condition is that they are serious about living, but not about living well; and since 
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their desire is infinite, they also desire things productive of limitless things” (1257b40-58a2). That 
is, people have an insatiable desire not to die, and money seems to make possible the storage of 
massive amount of resources that can hold death off. Obviously this behavior is not clearsighted 
because it presupposes that death can be completely forestalled with enough resourcefulness—that 
death is not a necessary fate for all human beings. People who take the time to think about how to 
make the most of life—those who Aristotle calls “serious about living”—would not squander their 
time fighting for immortality. They would realize that, whatever a good life may be, it must be 
choiceworthy even or especially in light of the fact that all human beings will eventually die. By 
the standard of the man serious about living, limitless moneymaking is a pitiable waste of precious 
time.  
Lest we believe the unseriousness Aristotle describes is confined only to the especially vulgar, 
he next shows us how it appears among the rest of us. We indeed aim at living well, but we 
understand living well in terms of bodily satisfaction. Money and the goods it makes available are 
inevitably unable to satisfy our lust for pleasure, but rather than directing our hedonistic efforts 
elsewhere, we try increasingly difficult and elaborate ways to make more money. We come to 
instrumentalize virtue as a means toward this gratification, unaware to ourselves that we are 
sacrificing pleasure in order to gain it. As Pangle argues, this fact reveals the fundamental truth of 
the hedonist’s soul. He writes, “The explanation for why even sensual hedonists tend at bottom to 
be more concerned with acquiring money than with enjoying pleasures money can buy is that they 




physical gratification as by the desperately infinite love of life, in the face of the awareness of 
mortal finitude.”45  
To recap, this section reveals that human beings are by nature quite vulnerable, and, by 
extension, fear of death is a ceaseless pathology of human nature. With this fear comes a passionate 
hope that somehow, in some way, death might not be inevitable after all. Human acquisitiveness 
in general is a response to neediness, but also tends to be expanded by this fundamental passion. 
We become hopeful that money can provide a sort of defense against our own mortality. This 
pitiable distraction tends to become all-consuming, pulling most people away from considering 
how they might live well in light of—rather than in denial of—the inevitability of death. Human 
acquisitiveness is both a natural response to genuine human need and an ensnaring distraction from 
addressing the full range of those needs.46 
Next, Aristotle curiously remarks that unnatural moneymaking may be necessary after all. He 
says, “Therefore concerning unnecessary moneymaking, both what it is and on account of what 
cause we are in need of it, has been said” (1258b14-16). Let us recall the basic structure of 
Aristotle’s economic history in order to make sense of this statement. Before the invention of 
money, man engaged in barter on account of natural scarcity. Barter met needs, but not completely 
enough. Money, however unnatural, did fulfill a natural need. Artful convention at this stage 
supplemented nature as a response to necessity. The adoption of money, however, also made the 
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descent into profiteering inevitable.  Because it is an unavoidable consequence of adopting money, 
profiteering too is unfortunately necessary.  
Conventions are necessary, but often psychologically damaging. Yet a convention’s potential 
for psychological damage evidently is not sufficient reason for avoiding its use altogether. 
Acquisitional expertise is consistent with the use of money because money is useful, though it is 
inconsistent with the unnecessary and useless acquisitional excesses thereby made possible.  
Solon now appears to be vindicated, at least to some degree. First, Aristotle seems to have 
tacitly expanded the range of the meaning of need and utility beginning with the introduction of 
money. Second, by expanding this range, he grants the reasonableness of adopting conventions 
that one knows will not have entirely positive effects. One such convention is money, which both 
fulfills a need and makes possible the expansion of human acquisitiveness beyond need and utility. 
Because it deals with the psychological distress at the heart of this expansion, the Solonic 
cultivation of religious fear is then hardly an alternative at all, but instead a necessary complement 
for the vast majority of people who will never read or understand Aristotle’s teaching. Aristotle 
seems to intend for his teaching in Politics I.8-11 to exist alongside rather than to replace 




VI. REASSERTION OF THE TELEOLOGICAL DOCTRINE 
Aristotle begins I.10 by adding to the curious conclusion of I.9. Not only do we now know 
why unnecessary acquisition is necessary, but “the question raised from the beginning is also now 
clear [I.8.1256a], viz. whether moneymaking belongs to the skilled economist and statesman or 
not, but must rather supply money [to them]” (1258a19-21). Importantly, the answers to both 
questions are apparently contained within I.8-9; I.10 serves as a supplement. 
The argument that follows is again surprisingly unsatisfying. Aristotle says,  
For just as statesmanship does not make human beings, but takes them from nature and 
uses them, thus also must nature hand over the earth or the sea or something else with a 
view to sustenance, and from these [forms of sustenance],47 it befits the economist to 
dispose of things as they should be (1258a21-25). 
First, is Aristotle’s claim about statesmanship here entirely true? Let us assume political 
communities grew only through births. If the common good of the political community required a 
population increase, would one not expect especially the statesman to know what sorts of policies 
might encourage a higher birth rate? The statesman indeed does not supervise every step of the 
creation of new citizens, but his influence is definitely the most artful part of the process. 
Nonetheless, Aristotle already suggested in I.8 that political communities also grow through the 
art of war, which is “in a way skilled possession by nature.” If the art of war is a mode of growing 
the political community and a natural form of acquisition, then the claim that the political art does 
not entail the art of acquisition cannot be true. 
Second, Aristotle again makes the argument that nature “must” do something. In general, the 
teaching of the exalted reading of Aristotle’s teleological doctrine is that nature is the standard by 
which to judge acquisition’s moral legitimacy. Statements such as the one above, however, suggest 
 




instead that the moral content of Aristotle’s nature has its basis in the moral expectations of human 
beings. But what if we set those expectations aside and assume that nature might not meet our 
expectations? Would it not then befit especially the economist to know not only how to use 
property, but also how to get it? Aristotle seems to be deliberately instilling a false sense of 
confidence in the availability of basic sustenance, which runs counter to the clarity about scarcity 
that a true skilled economist would need. Why would he do this? 
Aristotle continues, 
For it does not belong to weaving to make wool, but to use it and to know what sort is 
useful and suitable or paltry and unsuitable. For otherwise someone might raise the 
question, “On account of what is moneymaking part of economics, but not a part of 
medicine? Indeed, those of the household also must be healthy, just as they must live or do 
any other of the necessary things.” And just as seeing to health belongs to the economist 
and to the ruler, and also does not belong to them but to the doctor, thus also does money 
belong to the economist and also not, but to the subordinate art (1258a25-34). 
Aristotle’s next step relies on a distinction between architectonic and subordinate arts. Getting 
wool, he claims, is an independent art separate from but subordinate to weaving. By this 
explanation, the two arts are different even though acquisition is in a way necessary for the exercise 
of the art of weaving. For if acquisition were not separate from the architectonic arts, then any 
number of the many arts that provide for the needs of the household would all belong to economics. 
In a way, however, these subordinate arts are part of the architectonic arts, but not in their entirety. 
The expert economist is not also a doctor, but rather the one who knows when the use of the art of 
medicine is necessary and to what degree. Economics, as an architectonic art, structures the use of 
the other arts according to the degree they are needed.  
Let us then consider the implications of this account of the arts for moneymaking and 
economics. We surmise that moneymaking is used by economics in accordance with human need. 




from the standard of need, as an art which pursues its ends without any particular standard in mind. 
The last time Aristotle had us consider medicine as an example, however, we realized that the 
other arts do not really produce aimlessly. Demand for the tailor or carpenter’s arts is limited by 
people’s awareness of their need for suiting or housing. That is, art as such is artful to the degree 
that it satisfies needs, and so consequently the subordinate arts can only be properly artful when 
governed by arts that give their products structure in accordance with the hierarchy of human 
needs. In order for moneymaking or medicine to make sense as arts at all, they must be limited by 
the demands of some more architectonic art. While Aristotle in this account has suggested that 
moneymaking is more completely an art when separated from economics, in truth it is only 
comprehensible as an art when subordinated to it. 
Aristotle, however, apparently rejects this conceptualization of the relationship between the 
arts. He does this, at least by the exalted reading of this passage, in order to preserve nature as the 
acquisitional artisan that provides for our needs.  He argues, “Most of all, as was said before, nature 
must supply sustenance. For providing sustenance to a newborn is the work of nature. For the thing 
that remains [i.e., afterbirth]48 is sustenance for that which is born. Hence moneymaking is 
according to nature for all from the fruits and the animals” (1258b34-38). Just as nature provides 
afterbirth to newborn mammals, she provides the crops and animals for our sustenance. The 
difficulty, however, is that crops and animals are not as easily available as afterbirth. As every 
farmer knows, if one tries to live off of the yields of an uncultivated field, he will likely starve. 
The human capacity to develop art is the way in which nature (i.e., human nature) provides for our 
sustenance.  
 




On the whole, Aristotle’s treatment of the relationship between nature and acquisition operates 
on two levels. On the surface, it presents moneymaking and the arts of rule as separate arts and 
argues that nature for the most part takes care of the former. Consequently, this has the moral effect 
of making unnatural acquisition appear like money grubbing. The surface level reading would not 
then leave its readers with true clarity about the art of acquisition because it obscures the demands 
of scarcity and our genuine need for some conventions. Nonetheless, it has the benefit of 
moderating the character of its reader’s political and household activity. But this consequence 
comes from its moral effects, not genuine knowledge of moneymaking and economics. On the 
deeper level, Aristotle’s treatment of this relationship shows that the true economist would be the 
one who subordinates moneymaking to the hierarchy of needs as revealed by the arts of rule. One 
cannot have any of these arts without having them all. Thus the juxtaposition of the surface level 
with the deeper one suggests two incredibly weighty conclusions: (1) the purpose of the surface 
level teaching is to bring those who rule towards an approximation in deed (but not understanding) 
of the clear-sighted acquisitional activities of a genuine possessor of the arts of rule, and (2) a 
genuine possessor of expertise in these arts would have an uncommon clarity about the things truly 





Aristotle begins I.11 by telling us that everything preceding this chapter related to knowledge, 
while what follows in the next chapter will explain utility. The practical application of I.8-10, he 
suggests, is not as obvious as we may think. Indeed, many commentators are baffled by what they 
consider to be a complete abandonment of his distinction between natural and unnatural acquisition 
which he had just reasserted in I.10.49 But attention to the larger rhetorical project of Aristotle from 
I.8-11 shows instead that I.11 clarifies rather than abandons the crucial dimensions of the previous 
chapters. 
Aristotle’s first step in this chapter is to argue that a moneymaker needs experience in the 
useful parts of moneymaking. He then presents three basic categories for classification of the 
modes of moneymaking to be learned. First, there are the elements of “the most proper 
moneymaking,” which include the various modes of acquiring sustenance—essentially the sorts 
Aristotle earlier called natural acquisition (1258b12-21). Second, there are the elements of the art 
of exchange: trade, moneylending, and wage labor. Third, “there is a third form of moneymaking 
between this and the first, for it has a part according to nature and a part of exchange, having to do 
with however many things that come from the earth and the fruitless but useful things that come 
from the earth, such as timber cutting and mining” (1258b27-31). 
Expert moneymaking by this account requires not simply experience in “the most proper 
moneymaking,” but also in the very modes of acquisition that Aristotle has repeatedly told us are 
unnatural and unnecessary. He now explicitly grants that the natural standard for moneymaking 
presented by the exalted reading of I.8-10 excludes some useful arts. But if these arts are truly 
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useful—that is, if they address real human needs—the relationship between art and nature 
according to the exalted reading of Aristotle’s earlier presentation becomes far more problematic. 
For if an art can be useful though unnatural, then nature is at best only an inconsistent or qualified 
standard for human action. This passage is the clearest example in Aristotle’s account of 
moneymaking that the unnecessary and unnatural things are, strictly speaking, still choice-worthy 
to the extent that they are useful for the satisfaction of natural needs. As Wayne Ambler argues, 
“we are forced to conclude that, for Aristotle, the end does not always ‘naturalize’ the means,” but 
also that those means do not lose their utility on account of their unnaturalness.50   
Aristotle’s next step offers a clue as to what his project is, 
And now each of these things have been spoken about generally, and an exact account is 
useful for laboring, but to linger on them is vulgar. The most artful of these works is 
whichever has the least chance; and the most vulgar are those which maim bodies the most; 
and the most slavish are those in which the body is most used; and the most un-wellborn is 
that which least needs virtue (1258b33-39). 
On the one hand, Aristotle seems to want to preserve the possibility of using the full range of 
moneymaking, and by extension, he grants the utility of the full range. On the other hand, he also 
wants to preserve or even heighten our sense that certain types of moneymaking are ignoble. His 
account aims to cultivate a sense of shame for resorting to certain means, even though this will 
make some who genuinely need to use those means unwilling to use them. A general reluctance to 
use them, which occasionally bows to the demands of special circumstances, seems to be the 
intended result. Aristotle seems to do this, as we considered earlier, in order to bring the 
moneymaking of a portion of his audience closer to the more moderate acquisition of truly skilled 
economists.  
 




Aristotle’s account of Thales’ moneymaking scheme, considered in its relation to his previous 
arguments, further clarifies his procedure. According to his tale, others were taking Thales’ 
poverty as evidence of the uselessness of philosophy, and reproaching him. But Thales, having 
observed through astronomy that a plentiful harvest of olives was approaching, raised enough 
money to monopolize all the olive presses in Miletus and Chios. When suddenly demand for the 
olive presses rose, Thales had complete control of the market and could hire out the presses on 
whatever terms he wished. Through this, Aristotle says, Thales showed, “that it is easy for 
philosophers to become wealthy, should they wish it, but it is not this that they pursue seriously” 
(1259a17-18). 
Thales’ understanding of the value of money differs from those who chastise him. For Thales, 
relatively little wealth is actually necessary, and so moneymaking is not worthy of much 
seriousness. Philosophy is useful even for the acquisition of wealth, as he himself demonstrated, 
yet the rebukes of his deriders suggest that his interest was not at all in its wealth producing 
capacity. Even though Thales could be far wealthier if he wished, he seems to prefer a life of 
contemplation for its own sake. The seriousness of philosophy stands independent of its usefulness. 
The situation of Thales’ deriders recalls Aristotle’s account of the psychology of limitless 
moneymaking. We saw there that human beings suffer from two related psychological conditions: 
(1) we fear death desperately, and (2) we hope to somehow overcome its apparent inevitability. 
This hope tends to energize our concern for property, making us believe on a subconscious level 
that somehow our stuff can fortify us from death. Someone in the grip of this hopefulness, 
however, would believe money to be among the most serious things, but Thales seems to have 
largely overcome this pathology. The story of Thales thus suggests that philosophy, as the study 




consequences of our psychological condition to a great degree. Moreover, this relief brings greater 
clarity about our actual natural needs and their worthiness of our acquisitional efforts in light of 
what is possible. Philosophy for human beings is both a much-needed medicine for the soul and 
an essential component of expert moneymaking and economics. The true economist is the 
philosopher. 
Aristotle closes his account of acquisition by elucidating the divide between philosophers and 
political life. “It is useful,” he says, “for statesmen also to know these things. For many cities need 
moneymaking and revenues of this sort, just like households, but even more” (1259a33-35). The 
very sorts of moneymaking toward which Aristotle was earlier generating reluctance is apparently 
quite necessary for the demands of civic life.  But if civic life needs so much energy directed 
toward moneymaking, surely it must be very difficult to avoid the psychological consequences 
that tend to accompany a commercial orientation. The city likely even depends on the lack of 
clarity that makes seriousness about moneymaking possible. Therefore the city appears to be in 
need of a means to obscure the fear-inspiring reality of human mortality and to offer a moral 
teaching that prevents the misdirection of moneymaking efforts (especially toward injustice, as 
Solon understood). Civic life’s dependence on large-scale moneymaking thus raises barriers to its 
capacity for clear-sightedness. The philosopher as an individual is uniquely capable of 
moneymaking expertise in a way that would absolutely collapse ordinary civic life.  
Aristotle has finally put us in a position to speculate why his teleological doctrine might have 
advantages over the fear of divine punishment cultivated by Solon. We have already considered 
that Aristotle’s doctrine is likely meant to exist alongside Solon’s rather than to completely replace 
it. It seems to speak to an audience of gentlemen who take pride in their self-sufficiency and their 




of divine retribution would likely coincide with a belief that those who have sacrificed real human 
needs are worthy of divine reward on account of their justice. That is, it would reorient the 
desperate hopefulness that drives unlimited moneymaking towards otherworldliness. It would also 
make no suggestion of the existence of natural limitation. Aristotle’s teleological doctrine, in 
contrast, may distort the extent of our natural penury, but does not claim that anything supernatural 
would ever intervene. His doctrine thus speaks to the gentleman’s concern for self-sufficiency 
while pushing it to be deeper and more thoughtful about necessity. Further, the thoughtfulness 
about necessity it inspires might even become intellectual seeds that germinate into philosophic 
clarity. Lastly and more politically, because Aristotle’s nature is non-punitive, it may also pose a 
smaller obstacle to use of commercial and industrial moneymaking as a means to satisfying the 





Aristotle is not ignorant of the harsh reality of natural scarcity. He understands the human 
condition as one of deep neediness and believes that human ingenuity should be used in response. 
Conventionality is, in light of this unfortunate condition, not to be completely rejected. Yet clarity 
about neediness requires that we not lose sight of convention’s purpose as a response to need. 
Natural wealth thus takes priority for Aristotle over conventional wealth, for natural wealth alone 
directly addresses our needy condition. But money, both on the level of the individual and on the 
level of politics, is not therefore unimportant. Natural limitations restrict our access to natural 
wealth, and for this reason the accumulation of cash makes perfect sense.  
Money is not, however, an unqualified good, despite its capacity to address our most basic 
needs. Aristotle recognizes that human beings want more than food, water, and shelter. We worry 
not just about staying alive in the moment but also about staying alive forever. Money not only 
remedies our scarcity, but also energizes our subconscious hopes that property can fortify us 
against our mortality. This natural pathology must be curbed in order to focus on the spiritual needs 
that make life rich. Money both helps to satisfy our needs and pulls us away from satisfying their 
full range.   
Thus, while Aristotle accepts the necessity of markets and respects the need for a market value 
that differs from use value, he would not embrace free markets. On the most basic level, Aristotle 
seems to think that religion should curb acquisitional excess in a way conducive to both the justice 
of community and the psychological health of the individual. Yet Aristotle, in a way, anticipates a 
qualified version of the modern capitalist’s objection that the individual pursuit of wealth would 
be beneficial for the community at-large. He would object that the unfettered pursuit of wealth 




capacity to pursue wealth to the degree that wealth is necessary. His teleological doctrine serves 
this purpose by creating a sense of shame among his gentlemanly audience that curbs the 
psychological damage of acquisition without preventing them from acquiring truly necessary 
wealth. Markets, in sum, are necessary, but we should not indulge in them so much that we lose 
sight of need and utility. 
Aristotle also argues that a true understanding of economics requires a more penetrating 
analysis of human psychology than ordinary political discourse and modern economics suggest. 
The core of Aristotelian economics is use value, but clarity about use value, it holds, is all too often 
distorted by natural psychological pathologies. The cure for these pathologies is philosophic 
clarity. As Aristotle’s tale of Thales shows, one can come to understand his truest needs if one 
becomes clearsighted about natural necessity—especially with regards to the mortality of human 
beings. But Aristotle also seems to think that ordinary political life depends on some lack of clarity 
about our true needs. The economic clarity of ordinary political life will then always be at some 
distance from that of the philosopher. The philosopher is the true skilled moneymaker and 
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